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EXECUTIVE NOTE ON INSURANCE BEHAVIOR AND PROSPECT THEORY
This paper provides analysts with an alternative way of thinking
about insurance purchase behavior that may be more natural than the
traditional approach which assumes that people purchase specific con-
tingent claims. In our formulation individuals are assumed to insure
themselves against specific amounts of coverage which will protect them
from a series of different states of nature where losses fall within a
specific range. Insurance firms tend to market coverage in this manner:
they offer $x worth of protection or $y deductible against a class of dif-
ferent events and set their premiums accordingly.
Here we investigate the implications on consumer choice of a convex
utility or value function. The same conceptual framework can be utilized
to characterize behavior if the utility or value function is concave in the
loss domain.
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PROSPECT THEORY AND INSURANCE BEHAVIOR
Howard Kunreuther. Warren Sanderson and Rudolf Vetschera
I. INTRODUCTION
Prospect theory was developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) as
an alternative model of choice under risk to help correct the deficiencies
of expected utility theory. On the basis of a series of laboratory experi-
ments. the authors postulated that:
a) Probabilities of uncertain events are evaluated according to a
probability weighting function IT,
b) Gains and losses due to such events are evaluated according to a
value function (v) which is concave for gains and convex for
losses. This note demonstrates that if this theory is applied to
insurance behavior. then the optimal decision for any given risk
involves one of two extremes: either purchase full coverage or
no insurance at all.
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no insurance at all.
II. A TWO STATE MODEL
To illustrate the above properties consider the simplest model where
the consumer faces a single loss, x, which is assumed to occur with pro-
bability p. He assigns a de cision weight rr{p) to this event and rr( 1-p) to
the event where no loss occurs. To protect himself against a negative out-
come, the consumer can purchase an amount of insurance I at a rate (r)
per dollar coverage. The objective is to find the optimal amount of
insurance coverage, I -, which maximizes the overall value V of the pros-
pect given by:
V(I) = rr(p) [v(-x + (l-r)I)] + [1 - rr(p)]v(-rI) (1)
subject to 0 ｾ I s x where v'(y),v"(y) > 0 for y ｾ 0 and v(O) = O. Since
V(I) is a convex function for all permissible values of 1. 1 the optimal solu-
tion cannot be in the (open) interval (O,x) but must be at a boundary. In
contrast, standard utility theory assumes a concave utility function for
which there may be an optimal interior solution. These two situations are
shown in Figure 1.
The two possible options, I- =0 or x, yield the following values:
V(O) =rr(p)v (-x)
V(x) =v (-rx )
lSpecitically,
V"(I) =1T(P)(1-r)2 v"(-x + (l-r)I) + [1-rr(p)]r 2v"(-rI) > 0
(2)
(3)
V(I)
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v (I)
x Io II"
Standard utility theory
Figure 1.
o
Prospect theory
I
Equating (2) and (3) we can find the critical insurance rate r· for given
values of rr(p) and x, where a consumer is indifferent between purchasing
o or x units of coverage.
To illustrate this result consider the case where x = 1 and
v(y) =eY -l for all y ｾ O. In this case r· = -In[rr(p)(e-1 -1) + 1]. If
p = .001 and the expectation principle holds so that (rr(p) = p) then
r· = .0006. Suppose an individual overweights low probability events, as
suggested by Kahnernan and Tversky, so that rr(.OOl) = .01. In this case
r· =,006.
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Ill. AN N-STATE MODEL
In reality, the decision problems related to insurance behavior are
much more complex than the simple model above. As suggested by
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) their model may be extended to several
states of nature, each causing a different type of loss. Furthermore, their
results suggest that individuals tend to recognize only a relatively small
number of such states. which are derived from an even more complex
reality by some editing mechanism.
Let n be the number of different events that are considered by an
individual and xi be the loss associated with event i assumed to occur
with probability Pi' We order the states according to the losses so that
Xi > xi-I' i = 1 ... n with Xo =O. The probability of experiencing a loss
ot at least xi dollars is thus given by
(4)
with an associated decision weight rr(Pi ). The relevant rates for covering
losses can also be specified analogously. Let Ti denote the rate associ-
ated with insuring against losses caused by event i.
Consider losses at a given size defined by the interval (l,u). To pro-
tect against all such losses one has to buy insurance against all events i
with Xi ｾ l. The rate for one dollar's coverage for such protection is given
by
R(L,u) =E Ti (5)
hS
where S =fi IXi ｾ l J is the set of all events that may cause such a loss.
(6)
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Insurance obtained at rate Rel ,u) will only cover that part of the loss that
actually falls within this given interval. It is comparable to a deductible
of size l and a maximum coverage of u. Many insurance companies actu-
ally offer such packages that cover losses in an interval regardless of its
cause.
To simplify the following exposition, we assume that the boundaries l
and u of these packages correspond to possible losses xi-I and xi' The
rate for protection against risks within the interval (xi-I' xi) then
becomes
"Ri = ｾ Tj
i=i
To illustrate, suppose x I = 1000, x2 =5000, and Xs = 10,000. There
would then be rates R I for purchasing insurance to cover losses between
o and up to 1000 from any event, R 2 to cover losses greater than 1000 and
up to 5000, and Rs to cover losses in the interval between 5000 and up to
10,000. If an individual purchased insurance to cover losses up to 3000,
then I I =1000 and 12 =2000;2 if he purchased coverage for any losses
greater than 1000, then I I =0, and 12 = 4000, and Is =5000.
The value function given by (1) is now modified to be:
V(II"" ,In) =ＧｩｾｬＷｔＨｐｩＩｖ｛ＭＨｘｩＭｘｩＭｬＩＫＨｬＭｒｩＩｉｩ｝Ｋ｛ｬＭＷｔＨｐｩＩ｝ｖＨＭｒｩｉｩＩ (7)
subject to 0 ｾ Ii ｾ xi -xi-I'3
ｾｓｵ｣ｨ behavior, however, is inconsistent with prospect theory as will be shown below.
A more detailed model would include a budget constraint that relates insurance expendi-
tures to the individual's income. For this simple exposition, we assume that the income is
sufficiently large so this constraint will not influence insurance decisions.
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Due to the convexity of the value function there is a critical value Rt,
which determines what ranges of loss for which a consumer will want to to
purchase insurance coverag e Ii' i = 1 ... n. Depending on the actual
rate schedule an individual will want to cover all. some or none, of the
risks facing him. For example, full coverage against all risks will be pur-
chased only if Ri ｾ R/, i =1 I ••• ,n: full coverage with a deductible
will be chosen if and
Ri ｾ Rt I i = j +1, ,n and no coverage will be purchased if
Ri > Ri ·, i = 1, ,n. An implication of the convexity of the value
function is that an individual will never choose partial coverage within any
given interval. Either Ii =0 or Ii =xi - xi-1'
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
The implication of prospect theory for insurance behavior is that
individuals do not make choices on the basis of asking how much cover-
age should I buy against a certain risk. Rather they estimate the possible
losses they can suffer from each of a number of different events and then
determine whether or not they what to protect themselves fully or not at
all within each possible range of losses. This process differs from the one
implied by the traditional concave utility function for losses utilized in
the economic analysis of insurance decision. Prospect theory suggests
that individuals utilize simplified heuristics in their choice processes.
Suppose people focus on only one or two possible events (e.g .. an automo-
bile accident causing x dollars damage; a minor or severe flood causing
%1 and x2 dollars losses), then one would expect to find individuals having
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a limited menu of alternative insurance options and choosing between
them on the basis of wholistic comparisons rather than making decisions
at the margin as implied by standard utility theory. The validity of each
of these models for describing insurance purchase behavior against
specific types of losses still awaits empirical verification.
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